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Venture Capitalist Attributes and Investment 
Vehicles: An Exploratory Analysis
Edgar Norton
Though some casual empirical evidence exists, few empirical studies have exam­
ined venture capitalist attributes, diversification, and investment strategy. This 
paper provides an initial empirical examination o f investment structure and how 
it relates to venture capitalist organizational form, size, level o f diversification, 
and financing stage prrference.
I. INTRODUCTION
As a source of risk capital, venture capital is important for the growth of 
private firms and for the economy. Formal venture capital firms have been 
around at least since the 1940’s, with the founding of American Research and 
Development (ARD). Between ARD’s investment in the fledgling Digital 
Equipment Corporation and venture capital-backed success stories such as 
Apple Computer, LOTUS, Intel, and MicroSoft, much has been written about 
venture capital in the popular press. But research on the financial aspects of 
venture capital has not occurred until relatively recently. Consequendy, 
casual empiricism provides much of the basis for our knowledge of the 
venture capital process.
Venture capital is the process of raising funds, investing them in small, 
private growth firms, and then monitoring the investments with the goal of 
achieving positive risk-adjusted returns upon exiting from the investment. 
Venture capital is a process which involves at least three sets of players. The 
first set is the investors, or limited partners, in the venture capital pool, usually 
wealthy individuals and financial institutions such as pension fiinds and 
insurance companies. Second is the venture capitalist firm which acts as the
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pool’s general partner. The venture capitalist invests the pool’s funds in 
start-up and expanding firms. The third player is the entrepreneurial firm 
which needs fiinds to finance continued growth. Depending on the future 
success of the entrepreneurial firm, a fourth player may or may not later 
appear to provide liquidity to the venture capital pool’s investors; the fourth 
player may be the public equity markets, another corporation, or members 
of the entrepreneurial team. About $30-35 billion was under management 
by venture capitalists in the early 1990’s (National Venture Capital Associa­
tion, 1991).
Of the relatively few empirical papers written about venture capital 
finance, most either use data from initial public offerings or from the 
proprietary Venture Economics database. Though casual empirical evidence 
exists, we are not aware of any empirical studies that examine venture 
capitalist attributes, diversification, and investment strategy. The goal of this 
paper is to provide an initial empirical look at investment structure and how 
it relates to venture capitalist organizational structure, size, level of diversifi­
cation, and financing stage preferences. This analysis will provide evidence 
for and against several casual empiricisms and will quantify our presently 
limited knowledge about particular venture capitalist characteristics and 
investment patterns.
Casual empiricism implies the venture capital investor, rather than the 
portfolio firm, plays the m ^or role in determining the pricing and structure 
of the investment (Sahlman, 1990). Deal structure can be quite complicated. 
Venture capitalists must negotiate deal terms with entrepreneurs in an effort 
to appropriately price the risk involved in an investment. Adding or deleting 
covenants and provisions in a deal changes the venture capitalist’s exposure 
to risk; this, in turn, may affect the pricing of the venture capitalist’s invest­
ment.
Due to their proprietary nature, the terms, provisions, and covenants of 
individual venture capital investments are not available for public anal)«is. 
Thus, an empirical study of investment structure must, by necessity, use data 
collected from a survey instrument. Given the inverse relationship between 
the level of detailed information requested and a survey’s response rate, this 
initial study focuses on venture capitalist attributes and three main financing 
structures: common equity, preferred equity, and debt.
The following section of the paper reviews some of the venture capital 
literature and terminology that is germane to our study. Section 2 describes 
the survey instrument. Section 3 discusses the results from our statistical 
analysis of the survey responses. The results are summarized and discussed 
in the concluding section of the paper.
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n. VENTURE CAPITAL CONCEPTS
Most venture capital firms are organized as limited partnerships with the 
venture capitalists as general partners and investors as limited partners 
(Sahlman, 1990). The typical life of a limited partnership is seven to ten years; 
thus investments made at the beginning of the partnership are expected to 
mature and return cash (or liquid securities, e.g., shares of new publicly 
traded firms) to the pool during this lifetime. Limited partners investing in 
venture capital pools know that theirs is a long-term, illiquid investment. For 
tax reasons, income is shunned, as any income is taxable to the partners 
(Sahlman, 1990). Distributing securities to the partners (e.g., following an 
IPO of a portfolio firm) does not create a taxable event; this only occurs when 
the securities are sold. Thus, with the exception of small business investment 
companies, investments made by limited partoerships should be structured 
so that returns are primarily in the form of capital appreciation rather than 
income.
Evidence exists that venture capitalists specialize their investments in 
certain industries and products (Bygrave, 1987, 1988). Venture capitalists 
specialize as they seek to add more than just money to their portfolio firms; 
they also seek to add value via their managerial and technical expertise 
(Norton & Tenenbaum, 1993; Sapienza & Timmons, 1989). The venture 
capitalist’s specialized expertise can help reduce the agency cost concerns 
that are inherent when investing in a portfolio firm (Lemer, 1992). Sahlman 
reports that in 1988 the average funds under management per professional 
(partner or associate) in a private limited partnership averaged $15 million 
per professional. For very large venture capital pools (total committed capital 
exceeding $200 million), the average funds per professional was $34 million. 
In addition to helping venture capitalists add value to their investments and 
reduce agency costs. Bygrave (1987) provides evidence that the venture 
capitalist’s expertise provides access to information and deal networks. Access 
to such networks and information flows is a means whereby venture capitalists 
control risk in their investments (Bygrave, 1988; Norton 8c Tenenbaum 1993).
Another organizational form for venture capital is that of a subsidiary of 
a corporation. In such cases, the venture capitalist will seek growing firms that 
can benefit from an equity infiision and that have a potential strategic fit with 
a large corporation.
A small business investment company (SBIC) or minority enterprise small 
business investment company (MESBIC) is a venture capital pool comprised 
of loans from the U.S. Small Business Administration and equity contribu­
tions from venture capital investors. SBICs can borrow four dollars from the
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SBA for every one dollar of stockholder equity. As a result of their interest 
obligations, SBICs require investments that will supply them with adequate 
cash flow.
Venture capitalists invest funds in start-ups, in firms that will shortly go 
public, and in everything in between. Early stage investments involve commit­
ments of funds to firms with little more than a business plan (seed stage) or 
an initial prototype and some market studies (first stage). Expansion stage 
financings (second and third stage) occur as the entrepreneurial team 
achieves certain milestones in terms of technology, production, market 
acceptance, and sales growth. Bridge or mezzanine financing infuses cash to 
help the firm sustain market penetration while awaiting favorable develop­
ments in the IPO or acquisitions market. Some venture capitalists also invest 
in leveraged buyouts (LBOs). This usually involves investing in a management 
team with the goal of assisting an established private firm to grow to sufficient 
size and profitability so a public market sale of equity can occur.
Ruhnka and Young (1991) discuss how the level of risk in a venture 
investment depends upon the financing stage of the investment. They find 
that early stage investments contain a great deal more risk than latter stage 
deals and that the composition of the investor’s risk exposure changes over 
the financing stages. The main source of risk in early stage investments arises 
from factors internal to the portfolio firm, such as poor management, 
inability to develop a workable prototype, or improper financial controls. In 
latter stage deals, most of the risk arises from factors which are external to 
the portfolio firm and are less subject to agency cost concerns, such as 
technological change, competitive pressure, or an economic downturn.
Sahlman (1990) reports that about two-thirds of venture capital fvmds are 
structured as limited partnerships and that in recent years up to 80 percent 
of the funds invested in venture capital pools have been invested in limited 
partnership pools. Due to their prevalence, part of our analysis will specifically 
examine influences affecting limited partnership investment patterns. This 
second set of analyses allows us to more closely examine investment structure 
influences without the confounding effects of other organizational forms 
being included in the analysis.
m . THE SURVEY INSTRUMENT AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
A survey w£is developed to determine the impact of various influences on the 
financial structure of venture capital investments. Prior empirical work in 
venture capital has not examined financing structure influences, nor do data
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bases exist to provide “hard” data for such a study. The responses to this survey 
project comprise a data base, albeit limited, for the study of venture capital 
financing preferences zind influences. The survey instrument requested 
information on various items, including the characteristics of the venture 
capital firm and the percentage of funds invested at various financing stages.
Prior versions of the survey were pretested among eight venture capital­
ists. Their comments and suggestions were incorporated into the final survey 
format. No one who was part of the pre-test was included in the mailings. A 
cover letter assured recipients that individual survey responses would be 
confidential and were to be anonymous. Surveys were mailed in Febru­
ary/March 1990 to 350 members of the National Venture Capital Association; 
second and third mailings focusing on non-respondents occurred in May 
1990 and in the summer of 1990. A total of 126 responses were received for 
a response rate of 36.0 percent. From comparing the average responses of 
the three mailings, no evidence of response bias exists.
The typical venture capital firm responding to the survey is a private 
limited partnership (item I of Table 1). In our sample, 72.2 percent of the 
respondents are limited partnerships; from Sahlman (1990), about 69 per­
cent of U.S. venture capital firms are organized as limited partnerships. Most 
of the respondents are larger fiinds, with over $50 million of total fimds 
managed (item IV). This is also in close agreement with Sahlman’s (1990) 
industry statistics; he reports the average (median) capital size of an inde­
pendent, private sector venture capitalist is $65 million ($30 million) in 1988. 
The portfolios of the firms in our sample are fairly diversified; over half of 
the respondents’ portfolios have investments in seven or more industries and 
nearly half have stakes in 30 or more companies (Items II and III).
The venture capitalists’ responses to a question regarding their relative 
commitment of funds to each financing stage are summarized in the four 
colimins presented in Table 1 (Item V). The financing stages listed in Item 
V are commonly used in the venture capital literature and are in standard 
use by practitioners (Sahlman 1990). The reported means are based upon 
the actual numerical replies given by the respondents. Our sample appears 
to be more actively involved in seed stage investing than the industry averages 
reported in Sahlman (1990, Table 1C). According to Sahlman’s data, about
12.5 percent of venture capital fimds are invested in seed stage investments,
67.5 percent in expansion stages, and 20.0 percent in leveraged buyouts. Our 
sample has about 25 percent of capital invested in seed stage deals, about 59 
percent in expansion stage deals, and 16 percent in LBOs.
Comparing the size and composition of the venture capital firms in our 
sample to industry data reported in Sahlman (1990), the firms in our sample 
appear to be representative of firms in the industry. An exception is that the
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Table 1
A ^ egate  Information Collected from 
Surv^ Items I through V.
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I. Type of Venture Capital Firm:
Frequency
i. Public 9 
Private 114 
Missing 3
ii. a. Limited Partnership 91
b. SBIC/MESBIC 14
c. Corporate Subsidiary 14
d. LBO 12 
(some respondents checked more than one category)
II. Number of Different Industries Represented in the Firm *s 
Portfolio (DIFINDS):
1-3 industries: 17
4-6 industries: 34
7-9 industries: 32
10 or more: 41
missing: 2
in. Number of Companies in the Firm's Portfolio (COMPS):
1-9: 25
10-19: 29
20-29: 18
30 or more: 53
missing: 1
IV. Total Amount of Funds Managed Within the Venture 
Capital Firm (TOTFUNDS):
less than $10 million: 16
$11-20 million: 12
$21-30 million: 10
$31-40 million: 12
$41-50 million: 7
over $50 million: 67
missing: 2
(continued)
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Table 1 
(continued)
V. Percentage ofFinancing Done at each Stage by the Respondents. The Reported Percentages are 
Summarized in the Categories Bebw. The Average for each Financing Stage is based upon the Actual
Numerical Responses.
Percentages
Stage 0-9% 10-20%  21-49% 50%  or more Average Number of firms
Start-up or seed 39 33 26 24 25.32% 122
first 31 34 41 14 22.63% 121
second 39 35 38 9 18.34% 121
third 59 39 17 6 12.46% 121
bridge 93 17 8 2 5.58% 120
LBO 79 9 15 17 16.08% 120
VI. Percentage of Current Investments which Include Some Form of:
Category: 1 2 3 4 5 6
 ^ Number
0% 1-20% 2 1 ^ 0 %  41-60%  61-80%  81-99% 100% of Firms
Common equity 9 52 17 7 3 11 25 124
(CSFIN)
Preferred equity 8 6 7 14 18 47 26 126
(PSFIN)
Debt (LTDFIN) 12 50 25 19 3 4 6 119
Mean Categorical Response
Standard Deviation of Categorical 
Responses
Common equity; 
Preferred equity: 
Debt:
3.613
5.167
2.891
2.183
1.724
1.483
sample firms have relatively more capital invested in seed stage deals than the 
industry average.
Table 1 also reports the categorical responses and the mean categorical 
response for the percentages of the respondents’ investments that involve 
common stock, preferred stock, and debt financing (Item VI). The most 
popular financing mode is preferred equity; the least used is debt. There is a 
wide range of responses for each financing choice, including venture capital­
ist firms that always use a particular financing mode (100 %) or that never use 
a particular financing mode (0%).
IV. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF SURVEY RESPONSES
First we examine the effect of diEferent classes of organizational structure on 
venture capital investment practices. In this analysis, we use the non-parametric 
median test. The median test can be used to determine if ft samples have been 
drawn from the same population or at least from populations of equal 
medians. The test statistic is distributed as a chi-square random variable with 
k - 1 degrees of freedom.^
Do venture capitalist organizational characteristics affect their relative use 
of investment vehicles? Table 2 presents information on the relationship 
between organizational form (limited partnership, SBIC, corporate subsidi­
ary) and the relative use of common equity, debt, and preferred equity by the 
respondents.
From the data presented in Table 2A, the use of common stock as an 
investment vehicle is related to the venture capitalist’s organizational form at 
the 10 percent level of significance. The data used by the median test shows 
that responding SBICs use relatively more common equity financing than 
limited partnerships; corporate subsidiaries use relatively less.
The test results shown in Table 2B indicate that similarities exist among 
the different organizational forms in their use of debt. But a statistical test 
using pairwise comparisons finds that SBICs use proportionately more debt 
in their investments than either limited partnerships or corporate subsidiar­
ies. This was expected because of their need for income to service their debt 
obligations. Coupled with the finding in Table 2A, these results apparently 
imply that SBICs frequently use convertible debt as an investment vehicle.
As shown in Table 2C, differences in organization form can lead to 
significant dififerences in the use of preferred equity. The data show that 
limited partnerships make more frequent use of preferred equity as an 
investment vehicle, which is in agreement with some casual empirical evi­
dence (Sahlman, 1990). SBICs and corporate subsidiaries are less likely to 
use preferred equity as often.
Next we examine the relationship between venture capitalist organiza­
tional form and the proportion of funds they invest across the different 
financing stages. Table 3 reports the results of a test which compares the 
relative investment (above or below the sample’s median) of funds across 
financing stages with organizational form.
The statistical results shown in Table 3 indicate that significant relation­
ships exist between the organizational form of the venture capitalist and the 
relative amounts of funds invested in the various financing stages. Significant
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Table 2
Panel A
Analysis of Common Stock Financing Patterns
Organization Form
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. Limited Partnership SBIC Corporate Subsidiary
Use of Common Equity is:
> median 40 8 5
< median 44 2 9
chi-square = 4.898 (.0864)
Notes: The test statistic has a chi-square distribution and is based upon a median test which 
compares the distribution of respondents across common stock financing categories 
from Table 1, item VI, to the different categories of organizational form. The level of 
significance is given in parentheses.
Panel B
Analysis of Debt Financing Patterns
Organization Form
Limited Partnership SBIC Corporate Subsidiary
Use of Debt is:
> median 35 7 6
< median 46 3 6
chi-square = 2.630 (.2684)
Note: The test statistic has a chi-square distribution and is based upon a median test which 
compares the distribution of respondents across debt financing categories from Table
1, item VI, to the different categories of organizational form.
Panel C
Analysis of Preferred Stock Financing Patterns
Organization Form
Limited Partnership SBIC Corporate Subsidiary
Use of Preferred Equity is:
> median 24 0 0
< median 62 10 14
chi-square = 8.567 (.0138)
Notes: The test statistic has a chi-square distribution and is based upon a median test which 
compares the distribution of respondents across preferred stock financing categories 
from Table 1, item VI, to the different categories of organizational form. The level of 
significance is given in parentheses.
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Table 3
Reported chi-square Test Statistics and Corresponding Probability Values from a Median 
Test We Examine Differences in the Relative Commitment of Funds to Various Financing 
Stages by Venture Capitalists of Different Organizational Forms.
Organizational Form:
chi-square Test Probability
ValueFinancing Stage LP SBIC Corp. sub. Statistic
SEED
> median 40 0 4 9.024'’ 0.0110
< median 44 10 9
FIRST
> median 43 2 4 5.057“ 0.0798
< median 40 8 9
SECOND
> median 32 6 5 1.730 0.4211
< median 51 4 8
THIRD
> median 25 7 8 9.614*= 0.0082
< median 58 3 5
BRIDGE
> median 27 2 5 0.931 0.6279
^ median 55 8 8
LBO
> median 34 5 5 0.339 0.8441
< median 48 5 8
Notes:  ^= significant at the ten percent level 
 ^= significant at the five percent level 
 ^= significant at the one percent level
differences in investing patterns exist between limited partnerships, SBICs, 
and corporate subsidiaries in the seed, first, and third round financing stages. 
From examining the cross-tabulations, we see these differences arise as SBICs 
and corporate subsidiaries invest proportionately less in seed and first stage 
deals and proportionately more in third stage deals than limited partnerships. 
Given their need for income to service their debt obligations, it is not 
surprising that SBICs are less involved in early stage deals. This observed 
investment pattern for corporate subsidiaries shows their inclination to invest 
in firms with successful track records.
Limited Partnerships
Because of their prevalence as a venture capitalist organizational form, 
further analysis examines only those respondents that indicated they were 
limited partnerships. The next set of an^yses studies venture capitalist size 
and portfolio diversification and their effects on investment vehicles and 
investment patterns.
Three measures are used to proxy venture capitalist size and diversifica­
tion; the number of different industries in the firm’s portfolio (DIFINDS, 
Table 1, Item II), the number of companies represented in the firm’s 
portfolio (COMPS, Table 1, Item III), and the total amount of funds under 
management (TOTFUNDS, Table 1, Item IV). Chi-square tests for inde­
pendence are used to determine if size and diversification are related to the 
use of the different investment vehicles^; we also report the relevant correla­
tion coefficient based upon the raw, uncategorized data. Self-reported data 
on the percentage of funds invested in each of the financing stages are used 
to compute correlation coefficients between the relative amount invested in 
each stage (Table 1, Item V) and the use of each investment vehicle (Table 
1, Item VI).
Common Equity
As seen in Table 4, the use of common equity as an investment vehicle is 
independent of size or diversification when DIFINDS and COMPS are used 
as proxies. However, size and common equity are related when TOTFUNDS 
is the size/diversification measure. The correlation coefficient computed 
using the raw data reveals that larger limited parmerships use relatively less 
common equity financing, although the correlation is not statistically signifi­
cant. Thus, somewhat weak evidence exists that smaller venture capital 
limited partnerships favor common equity as an investment vehicle more so 
than larger ones.
Correlation analysis indicates that the use of common equity as an 
investment vehicle may also result from a “financing stage effect.” Analysis 
indicates that venture capitalists that use relatively more common equity 
financing are less committed to early stage deals and are more heavily 
involved in latter stage financing, although only the correlations with first 
stage and LBO stage investments are statistically significant. These findings 
imply that the use of common equity as an investment vehicle is more likely 
to occur in latter stage investments.
Venture Capiedist Attributes 191
Table 4
Limited Partnerships’ Common Stock Financing Patterns
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Cross-tabulations between Limited Partnerships ’ use of Common Stock 
Financing and Their Size and Diversification.
CSFIN Category:
1 2  3
DIFINDS Category: 1 30 11 16
2 14 6 10
Chi-square = 0.325 j&-value = 0.850
Correlation coefficient (raw data) = 0.084
/►-value = 0.221
COMPS Category: 1 20 11 14
2 24 6 13
Chi-square = 1.827 /^value = 0.401
Correlation coefficient (raw data) = -0.147
ji^ value = 0.086
TOTFUNDS Category: 1 12 11 10
2 33 5 17
Chi-square = 8.922 jt>-value = 0.012
Correlation coefficient (raw data) =-0.131
/rvalue = 0.112
Correlation Coefficients Between the Limited Partnerships’ Use of Commm.
Stock Financing and the Percentage of Financing Done in Various Stage Deals.
Correlation
Financing Stage Coefficient p-value
Seed -0.1027 0.172
First -0.3756 0.000
Second -0.1175 0.141
Third 0.0502 0.323
Bridge 0.0837 0.223
LBO 0.3809 0.000
It is somewhat surprising that there is no significant relationship between 
the amount of seed stage investing by a venture capitalist and the use of 
common stock as an investment vehicle. Although a statistically significant 
negative relationship exists between the percentage of funds invested in first 
stage deals and the use of common equity, other factors must partially 
mitigate the effects of using common equity for seed stage investments.
Long-term debt
The results of chi-square tests reported in Table 5 demonstrate that there 
is a significant relationship between venture capitalist portfolio diversifica­
tion, £is measured by DIFINDS, and the use of debt by the venture capitalist. 
A crosstabulation table indicates that venture capitalists that are diversified 
across a greater number of industries are more amenable to the use of debt 
as an investment vehicle, although the positive correlation coefficient com­
puted from the raw data is not statistically significant.
Correlation analysis indicates that proportionately larger involvement in 
seed, first, second, and third stage financing (early and expansion stage deals) 
is negatively related to the use of debt. Greater relative investments in LBO 
stage deals is positively related to the use of debt. This supports the conjecture 
(Norton & Tenenbaum, 1992) that debt is unfit as an early stage financing 
vehicle; its use is more appropriate for latter stage deals where tangible assets 
and positive cash flow make debt a more appropriate vehicle for monitoring 
the firm.
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Preferred Equity
The chi-square tests reported in Table 6 indicate statistically significant 
relationships between the COMPS and TOTFUNDS measures and use of 
preferred equity. Cross-tabulations and correlations indicate that venture 
capitalists with investments in more portfolio firms (COMPS) and with 
larger amounts to invest (TOTFUNDS) are more likely to use moderate to 
high amounts of preferred equity in their portfolios. In addition, the 
correlation coefficient between DIFINDS and the relative amount of pre­
ferred equity used is negative and statistically significant, although the 
chi-square test accepts the null hypothesis of independence between these 
two variables.
Venture capitalists’ relative involvement in seed, first, and second stage 
deals is positively related to the venture capitalist’s relative use of preferred 
equity as an investment vehicle, whereas venture capitalists with larger relative 
commitments to LBOs are less likely to use preferred equity. Unlike our 
findings using common stock, here there is a significant positive relationship 
between the use of preferred equity and the relative amount of seed stage 
financing by the respondents. Evidentiy preferred equity is an attractive 
means whereby seed stage investments are monitored to reduce agency 
concerns.
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Table 5
Limited Partnerships’ Debt Financing Patterns
Cross Tabulations Between Limited Partnerships* Use of Debt Financing and 
Their Size and Diversification.
LTDFIN Category
DIFINDS category: 1 36 14 5
2 11 17 1
Chi-square = 9.077 p-value = 0.011
Correlation Coefficient (raw data) = 0.067 p-value = 0.273
COMPS category; 1 29 12 4
2 20 19 2
Chi-square = 3.722 p-value = 0.156
Correlation coefficient (raw data) = -0.107 p-value = 0.164
TOTFUNDS category: 1 18 13 2
2 31 18 3
Chi-square = 0.219 p-value = 0.896
Correlation coefficient (raw data) = -0.083 p-value = 0.226
Correlation Coefficients Between the Limited Partnerships* Use of Debt 
Financing and the Percentage of Financing Done in Various Stage Deals.
Financing Stage
Correlation
Coefficient p-value
Seed -0.2032 0.032
First -0.2688 0.007
Second -0.2586 0.009
Third -0.1686 0.064
Bridge -0.1017 0.182
LBO 0.5861 0.000
Table 6
Limited Partnerships’ Preferred Stock Financing Patterns
Cross tabulatims between Limited Partnerships ’ Use of Preferred Stock 
Financing and Their Size and Diversification.
PSFIN category
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DIFINDS category: 1 5 15 39
2 1 12 17
Chi-square = 2.454 p-value = 0.293
Correlation coefficient (raw data) = -0.139p-value= 0.098
COMPS Category: 1 6 11 30
2 0 16 27 
Chi-square = 6.920 p-value = 0.031
Correlation coefficient (raw data) = 0.144 p-value= 0.88
TOTFUNDS category: 1 4 13 17
2 2 13 41
Chi-square = 5.552 p-value = 0.062 
Correlation coefficient (raw data) = p-value = .009
Correlation Confidents Between the Venture Capitalists ’ Use of Preferred Stock 
Financing and the Percentage of Financing Done in Various Stage Deals.
Correlation
Financing stage Coefficient p-value
Seed 0.1966 0.032
First 0.2135 0.023
Second 0.1282 0.117
Third -0.0800 0.229
Bridge 0.0644 0.277
LBO -0.3507 0.000
V. CONCLUSION
This paper has provided empirical evidence that differences in venture 
capitalists’ use of financing vehicles are partially explained by venture capi­
talists’ characteristics and investing patterns. We find that venture capital 
organizational form affects the type of investments in our sample. SBICs and
corporate subsidiaries are less likely to be involved in the early financing 
stages. SBICs are more willing to use common equity and debt, presumably 
in the form of convertible debt, in their investments. Both corporate subsidi­
aries and SBICs use relatively less amounts of preferred equity in their 
investments.
Focusing on the limited partnership organization form, we find that 
venture capitalist size and diversification has some impact on financing 
structure in our sample. The findings, however, are not particularly robust 
across our different size and diversification measures.
Compared to smaller and less diversified venture capitalists, we find that 
larger venture capitalists and venture capitalists that have many firms in their 
investment portfolios use relatively more preferred equity as an investment 
vehicle. More diversified venture capitalists (as measured by DIFINDS) use 
relatively more debt as an investment vehicle, and larger venture capitalists 
(as measured by TOTFUNDS) use relatively less common equity financing.
Another mzyor determinant of financing structure preferences is the 
distribution of the venture capitalist’s investments among the different fi­
nancing stages. Limited partnerships favoring common equity as an invest­
ment vehicle are less involved in early stage deals, while those using less 
common equity are more heavily committed to early stage investments. 
Strong sentiment in favor of preferred equity investing is seen in venture 
capitalists that are relatively more devoted to early and growth stage deals. 
Less frequent use of debt occurred in venture capitalists with relatively greater 
commitments to early stage deals and relatively less commitment to LBO stage 
deals.
From these results, apparently the differences between early and later 
stage deals and investors of different sizes and diversification strategies are 
such that specific investment vehicles are needed to best meet the investor’s 
goals. But a disappointment of the study is the number of insignificant test 
statistics and seemingly inconsistent results (e.g., the relationship between 
common equity financing and the relative investments in seed and first stage 
investments reported in Table 4). This apparentiy indicates that much of the 
variation in the use of common stock, preferred stock, and debt as investment 
vehicles is not explained by our analysis. Obviously, this implies additional 
research is needed to explain these observed venture capit^ behavior pat­
terns.
Future research may examine if differences in the management philoso­
phy and the style of venture capitalists (as found by MacMillan, Kulow, & 
Khoylian, 1989) affects deal structure. Future research can also examine the 
use of “micro” elements of financial contracting in venture capitalist deals, 
for example, the provisions found in term sheets. Perhaps an examination of
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the agency and monitoring relationships that exist in venture capital can 
increase our knowledge of the empirical relationships we observe between 
venture capitalist attributes and investment characteristics.
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NOTES
1. For an overview of the median test, see S. Siegel, Non-Parametric Statistics for the Behavioral 
Sciences, McGraw-Hill: New York, 1956.
2. To ensure adequate observations in each cell for the chi-square test, the categories for 
the number of different industries in the limited partnership portfolio (DIFINDS), the 
number of different companies in the portfolio (COMPS), and the amount of funds 
under management (TOTFUNDS) shown in Table 1 were combined into two categories 
for each size/diversification measure. The DIFINDS categories were combined so one 
class included venture capitalists investing in one to nine different industries and the 
other class contained venture capitalists investing in 10 or more industries. Two COMPS 
categories included those venture capitalists witi less than 30 portfolio firms and those 
with 30 or more portfolio firms. One TOTFUNDS category contains investors with $50 
million or less to invest, the other has those with more than $50 million. The CSFIN, 
PSFIN, and LTDFIN categories were each collapsed into three categories of low usage, 
(0-20%), moderate usage (21-80%), and high usage (over 80%).
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